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Abstract 
According to the predominating discourse, the radio spectrum has been converted into 
a technological platform of strategic importance for the economic development of 
countries.  Wireless Internet and the promises of access at ‘any time, in any place’ add 
political and economic pressure to a platform, which has been an almost exclusive 
monopoly of radio and television for years. The main aim of this article is to study the 
radio spectrum management in Spanish broadcasting from its origins until the present 
day. The article also seeks to show the existing relationship between how frequencies 
are managed and the resulting broadcast model.  
 
                                            
1 This article is part of an international research the first author is working on. Further information: 
http://montsebonet.net/transitions-broadcasting-policy-technology/; http://www.uta.fi/cmt/post-
broadcast/focus_a.html. 
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Radio was not born as a medium for mass communication but rather as a means of 
point-to-point communication, to serve commercial and military interests. What was 
originally called ‘wireless’ became, around the 1930s, ‘radio’, and what had been 
point-to-point telecommunication became broadcasting, i.e. point-to-masses 
transmission (Lewis and Booth, 1990). In this regard, it should be noted that although 
there were researchers, amateur enthusiasts, armed forces, shipping companies, large 
electrical equipment manufacturers and many others behind the birth of radio (and 
later television), different governments soon decided to intervene in order to gain 
control over it. There were three basic motivations for doing so: First, to avoid 
interference between broadcasters, and, second, the need to prevent broadcasting from 
being able to influence the population in certain ways. Two wars, the Spanish Civil 
War and the Second World War, are good examples of what could be achieved using 
the nascent mass media (Hale, 1975). Finally, the limitations of the platform itself led 
governments to treat the radio spectrum as a public asset that required control and 
organisation. In fact, the differences between the main broadcasting models around 
the world (public, private and mixed) were (and still are) focused on who can and 
cannot make use of radio spectrum and how. And that owner was the State, in all 
countries, including the United States. 
 Hence was born the myth of a lack of frequencies, which time has proven to be 
mistaken. The spectrum is not sparse, but it is limited and requires rational and 
efficient management. The difference is one of nuance, but it is an important one.  Of 
the total of the electromagnetic spectrum, the range of especially appropriate 
frequencies (coverage, extension, quality) for radio-diffusion was limited. The new 
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consumption ways of audiovisual products of all types, together with the advantages 
of an Internet without wires, has added pressure among stakeholders struggling for the 
same range of frequencies (UHF band); wireless Internet is ideal not only in specific 
geographic zones of difficult access or where the deploying of the cable is too 
expensive, but rather it is also the way to keep the promise of rapid and immediate 
access in any place and at any time.  
For this, studies on TV White Space (TVWS) abound (Ko et al., 2014), the auctioning 
of digital radio frequencies such as downlink for mobile-phone companies (European 
Commission, 2015a) has begun, and the social character of the spectrum is claimed, 
even defending it from the activism standpoint (Dunbar-Hester, 2009). Nobody wants 
to be expelled from the UHF band. 
 
Object of study and objectives 
The object of this article is the management of radio spectrum for its use in 
broadcasting in Spain from the early 20th century until the early 21st century. In turn, 
the main objective is to analyse the existing relationship between the conception and 
management of airwaves and the resulting broadcasting model in this country. This is 
an important historic moment in which a new digital audiovisual system is being 
created and, in it, the radio spectrum has a decisive role reserved for it.  To understand 
how the spectrum has been managed until now helps in seeing, with more clarity, how 
this new system can be outlined.  
Several previous studies by authors on the subject of both radio (Bonet, 2007, 
2012; Arboledas and Bonet, 2013 and 2014; Bonet and Arboledas, 2011; Bonet et al., 
2009) and television (Guimerà and Bonet, 2012; Guimerà and Blasco, 2012; Guimerà, 
2006 and 2014; Bonet et al., 2014) and the liberalization of radio spectrum, digital 
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dividend or the switch-off (Bonet et al., 2008) offer suggestions of unprofessional and 
highly politically motivated management both in terms of radio and television. 
Studies by other authors (García Leiva and Starks, 2009; García Leiva 2009 and 
2013; Cullell, 2011; Schumann, 2011; Fernández-Quijada and Arboledas, 2013; 
Massaro, 2013; Harvey, 2014; Ala-Fossi and Bonet, 2015; Delgado, 2015) indicate 
the same kind of tendency regarding the future of broadcasting and the key role radio 
spectrum is playing. 
 Based on this set of indicators and evidence, the general hypothesis underlying 
this research is that, in Spain, a policy of ‘occupation’ of the spectrum guided by 
political and clientelistic interests has always prevailed, which has impeded any 
professional attempt to define a rational and efficient broadcasting model, both 
under the Dictatorship and in times of Democracy. In other words, the political 
system and its needs have defined the model for the use and management of the 
spectrum, which has been regulated on the basis of a fait accompli or following a 
judicial overturn.  
This article pursues two specific objectives: First, to systematize the existing 
knowledge of the management of radio spectrum in Spain in relation to different 
media and at different moments in history, and, second, and derived from the former, 
to validate this image of occupation of the spectrum as outlined by previous partial 
studies. This will obtain an overview for Spain at a time when radio spectrum has 
become a central issue around the world. It should be made clear that the aim is not to 
produce a detailed description of the historical process in question but rather to focus 
on four key moments: the birth of broadcasting; the irruption of the Franco 
dictatorship and its subsequent consolidation; the transition to democracy, and the 
digitalization process. In accordance with the above, the methodological design is 
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based on documentary analysis, applied both to previous research and to European 
and Spanish legislation. The authors have not limited their work to revisiting previous 
studies, but have also gone back to analyse the regulations from a new perspective. 
The basic purpose of the review is to identify the most relevant actions and decisions 
affecting the organization of the spectrum. That is to say, that a transversal and 
historic documental revision has been made which puts the spotlight only on the 
management of the spectrum, until now not dealt with this depth, since the studies on 
clientelist systems usually centre on the contents, the level of politicisation, 
organisation, etc. 
 
Theory framework  
The research carried out to elaborate this article has needed a theoretical framework 
that permits it to take on, on one hand, the notion of efficient management of the 
spectrum and, on the other hand, the logics of political intervention upon the system of 
media in the Western democracies. Without a clear definition of the first one, it 
becomes very difficult to identify and tackle the politicisation of the spectrum, which 
is proposed in our hypothesis.  
In this sense, before taking on the theoretical perspective of our study, it is necessary 
to define, due to its importance, the idea of efficiency, with respect to the management 
of the radio spectrum.  Purely technical criteria exist in order to define what is the 
efficient use of spectrum (ITU, 2006), but in terms of management (closely linked to 
economic criteria), it refers to avoiding an under-utilisation of the frequencies (RSPG, 
2014). 
In relation to the use of the spectrum, Directive 2002/21/EC indicated the idea, 
recurring in this type of documents, that it is important to ‘manage the attribution and 
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the assignation of frequencies of the most efficient manner possible’ (pg. 35).  The 
same can be read in other documents such as Decision 676/2002/EC (also known as 
DER) or the Review of the regulatory framework of the UE of the networks and 
services of electronic communications of 2006, by affirming the need of introducing 
new forms of spectrum management and licencing ‘so as to promote economic and 
technical efficiency in the use of this valuable resource’ (pg. 7).  These are only some 
examples of what is repeated endlessly in hundreds of documents, reports, studies and 
analyses (Bonet et al., 2008).  More closely in time, in its 4th Progress Report, the 
Radio Spectrum Policy Group (European Commission, 2015b) dedicates one of its 
chapters to include, among other themes, questions concerning licence duration and 
renewal, spectrum fees, refarming, competition, coverage obligations, standardisation, 
and management of under-utilized spectrum.  Frequently it is forgotten that, whatever 
the degree of benefits that is obtained from the spectrum, ‘it should have 
repercussions, in the final instance, in the whole of society’ (GRETEL, 2007:  19).  
This same research group (2007:  31) proposes three dimensions of efficiency:  
technical, social and economic, and it reminds us that one should never forget that the 
ownership, management, planning, administration and control of the spectrum 
correspond to the State and should guarantee that the citizenry be the principal 
beneficiaries.  For this, ‘the efficient use is presented as the guarantor, the backbone 
that should marry the safeguarding of the public good to its new role of the generator 
of wealth and prosperity’ (Bonet et al., 2008: 54). 
For all of this, in this article, the word ‘occupation’ is used in the metaphorical sense 
of ‘being inside’; even though the frequency awarded is not being used, this does not 
imply for the radio or TV station being expelled from the spectrum.  In summary, 
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when the minimum requisites for the guarantee of efficiency are not fulfilled because 
the clientelist political factors are favoured. 
 
Once these concepts are clarified, we have reviewed and analyzed the history 
of broadcasting as well as the past spectrum policies in Spain combining two different 
theoretical artefacts, the transition models by Jakubowicz (2004, 2008) and 
Jakubowicz and Sükösd (2008); and the categorization of media systems in 
democratic societies developed by Hallin and Mancini (2004), in which Spain 
represents the polarized pluralist model.  
On the one hand, the idealistic / mimetic / atavistic model (Jakubowicz, 2004, 2008) 
explains transitions in the media from authoritarian political systems to other 
democratic ones (specially, post-communist societies). Briefly said, the mimetic model 
seeks to transfer the Western media model, with freedom of press and a dual radio-
television system, while the atavistic represents the maintenance of control over the 
media, like in the past, even though the country has democratized. The authors (2008) 
consider the atavistic model to be predominant in less democratic countries. Although 
it formally could be among the countries that followed a mimetic orientation, in 
practice the atavistic orientation was imposed in Spain, because the reforms were 
insufficient (Arboledas and Bonet, 2014). In fact, it has a certain degree of logic 
because, as Jakubowicz and Sükösd (2008: 19) very well point out, upon referring to 
the public service broadcasting in Mediterranean Europe, this service ‘is as distant 
from the ideal of independent public service media, as it is in post-communist 
countries’, because in some cases an excessively idealized and difficult-to-achieve 
model in its first stage of transition has been sold. According to these authors, this 
defines the atavistic model as a partitocratic system that substitutes civil society in 
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great measure and in which the political parties accept the transition before the public 
but they continue holding on to some defining elements of the ancien regime. 
 On the other hand, according to the categorization of media systems in 
democratic societies developed by Hallin and Mancini (2004), Spain could be said to 
have a pluralist, polarized or Mediterranean media system, founded on major State 
intervention. Of all the characteristics defining it, those covered here are the major 
political parallelism of the media with respect to political ideologies and the parties 
that represent them; the political instrumentalisation of the media by both political 
and economic agents; the absence of a rational-legal authority to guarantee formal and 
generalized standards of governance; and the major clientelism that typifies relations 
between the State and the private sector. These four elements are essential for 
understanding the management of radio spectrum and, therefore, how the present-day 
Spanish audiovisual system was configured. 
 
(Table 1. Atavistic and Polarized models vs. Efficiency) 
 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) include clientelism among the defining elements of the 
Mediterranean model.  Previously, Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002) had already 
indicated the instrumentalisation of private media or the politicisation of public 
broadcasting and media regulation as two of the elements that define the relation of 
the media system with clientelism policy.  Jakubowicz and Süskösd (2008) consider it 
to be a distinctive and dominating element of some mediatic systems, in which 
political power offers something (in our case, radio and television frequencies) in 
exchange of editorial support from the medium. 
 
 9 
The Spanish case has one more peculiarity: The press made a pact with the political 
forces in the first years of the Transition (those most fragile and full of attempts and a 
failed coup d’état) to strengthen the brand-new democracy, but this ‘agreement’ lasted 
too long, preventing the press from evolving towards a more mature and less partisan 
media system (Papatheodorou et al., 2003). 
 
Spain within the European context 
Throughout the deregulation process that began in Europe in the 1980s, both 
regarding telecommunications and the audiovisual industry, the radio spectrum played 
a central role, as ‘scarce’ common asset (or ‘limited’, depending on variations in 
institutional discourse over time) that due to digitalization lost its status as a single 
channel (i.e. when a frequency was equated with a programme) and fitted into the 
same platform category as satellite or cable broadcasting. Electronic communications 
(i.e. audiovisual services via mobile) gained a new importance, thus putting a check 
on the traditional broadcasting service. Radio and television were no longer the one 
and only user in some spectrum bands. In short, this is an economic battle between 
two ways of understanding mass communication and its business model, and the radio 
spectrum is the battlefield (Ala-Fossi and Bonet, 2015; Bonet et al., 2008; European 
Commission, 2005 and 2007; GRETEL, 2004; Hellman, 2010; Mullooly, 2012). 
From the first Green Paper on convergence (1997), through the Green Paper 
on radio spectrum policy (1998) and its results (Next steps in radio spectrum policy, 
1999) and until Pascal Lamy’s Report (Results of the Work of the High Level Group 
on the Future Use of the UHF Band 470-790 MHz) in 2014, Spain has been 
transposing the different European standards. It implemented its analogue television 
switch-off in 2010 and left its digital radio (DAB, Digital Audio Broadcasting) on 
stand-by (frequencies were awarded but are barely in use). The Spanish government 
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had difficulty in complying with the periods established for the digital dividend, 
which affected the 800 MHz band, while like other countries around the world, it was 
preparing for the World Radio-communication Conference, WRC-2015. 
Of the different types of spectrum management (‘command and control’, 
‘market-based’, ‘licence exempt’) Spain has adopted the classic ‘command and 
control’ model, the basis of which is State control over the planning and use of the 
spectrum, whereby it is decided who is granted which part of the spectrum and for 
what purpose (García Leiva, 2013; Hendriks et al., 2011). This is the model that 
started to face serious criticism from the 1990s due to its lack of flexibility following 
the appearance of new wireless services (Analysys Consulting et al., 2004; EBU, 
2012; European Commission 2005, 2007). In the 21st century, the economic strength 
promised by new broadband services is threatening this form of management further 
still. 
Within this model, there are different ways of awarding frequencies. In the 
Spanish case, the respective Ministry (which in 2016 is the Ministry of Industry, 
Energy and Tourism) is in charge of radio spectrum planning and distributes radio and 
television frequencies to each of Spain’s 17 autonomous communities. It is the 
Government of Spain, not the national regulatory body (National Commission of 
Market and Competence, CNMC, created in October 2013), that grants national radio 
and television licences, and all but one of Spain’s regional governments grant regional 
and local licences. The exception is Catalonia, where the regulatory authority (Catalan 
Audiovisual Council, CAC) awards licences. The tender system is used, also known 
as the ‘beauty contest’ (Hendricks et al., 2011). This process and the different 
concessions made in Spain since the return to Democracy have been permanently 
contested, criticized and doubted in terms of their objectiveness and meritocratic 
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nature (Fernández-Quijada and Arboledas, 2013; Arboledas and Bonet, 2014). 
To better understand what the article aims to show, we should note that Spain is a 
country in which such platforms as cable and satellite are still residual in comparison 
with the terrestrial radio and television platforms. According to the latest data of 
AIMC (2015), terrestrial television has a penetration of 88.4%. This obviously means 
that airwave management plays a central role in the configuration of the media 
system.  
 
Back to the origins 
Spanish radio, as we understand it today, was officially born, after years of testing, in 
1924, at the height of the Primo de Rivera Dictatorship. At first, there was only 
private radio, which could broadcast thanks to a concession granted by the State. In 
1932, the first signs of occupation of the spectrum emerged when local radio was 
created in Spain. Its appearance was not the result of planning or a premeditated 
project, but instead it was an attempt to reach every corner of the country, so private 
initiative achieved what the State did not. Because since 1929 the government had 
been trying to create a public radio network without success, given the turbulent 
political situation at the time. This solution was something of a half measure, as the 
maximum authorized transmission potency for local radio was 200 watts and there 
could be no more than one station per town or city. Up until 1932 there were only 
eight radio stations, but from that year on and until the outbreak of the Civil War, the 
figure would rise to almost seventy. In short, neither a strong State broadcasting 
system was created (not until 1937) nor were private initiatives allowed to make 
one under equal conditions.  
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Once the conflict was over, the peculiar mixed Spanish model was created, for 
Franco did not do away with private initiative, although he did subject it to a severe 
process of ideological filtering. Under Franco, there were two major stages in terms of 
the management of the spectrum and the configuration of the radio model. 
a) The period just after winning the war was characterized by Spain’s lack of 
participation in international agreements, as a result of Franco’s economic 
autarky, and the isolation imposed by some international bodies. This implied 
its absence from different conferences at which frequencies were distributed. 
From the 1940s to the 1960s, authorisations were granted to create new radio 
stations to cover as much of the territory as possible, while extension of the 
national public network was completed. This could be considered the period 
of uncontrolled occupation of the spectrum by the state itself, when radio 
frequencies were used to pay the loyal groups that helped him to win the war.   
b) But in the late 1950s, an attempt was made to rectify this situation in which 
quantity meant more than quality, when Spain started to be reaccepted back 
onto international forums. At that time, the uncontrolled growth of radio 
frequencies in Spain caused interferences and was heavily criticized around 
Europe, hence the need to restructure the broadcasting panorama. A 1958 
decree, the basis for the Transitory Plan of 1964, could be described as the 
moment when Frequency Modulation was officially born in Spain. The Plan 
meant the disappearance of many local broadcasters and the obligation for AM 
stations to broadcast simultaneously in FM. As a result of this, Spain joined 
the 1948 Copenhagen Frequency Plan. The limitations of medium wave bands 
and the impossibility of more broadcasters proliferating were the arguments 
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that justified the change. Spain went from having 400 to 167 AM radio 
stations. But, as we shall see later, this situation did not last for long.  
 
As for television, its appearance in 1956 consolidated the typical broadcasting 
model of a dictatorship, for like radio it was used as a propaganda weapon. Television 
first appeared in times of financial hardship (autarchy was crippling Spain) and of 
political turbulence (due to the disputes between factions of the regime); and it lacked 
order, agreements or models. It had no labour or legal structure as a company. The 
lack of direction and the reluctance to apply any licence fee meant that Spanish 
television, from the outset, was reliant on advertising; despite being a public 
television, it was also commercial. 
This was therefore a considerably complex model that would affect the future 
development of both media:  
a) It was a broadcasting model based, like in the other Western 
European countries, on the laws of the radio-communication sector 
and not the experiences of the printed press, as in the USA.  
b) Under Franco, radio was a mixed system, while television was a 
public monopoly.  
 
In summary, with this entire context, in Spain the radio spectrum was clearly 
important to: a) monopolize television; b) distribute radio frequencies as ‘gifts’ 
without caring about the efficient management of the platform.  
 
Transition and democracy 
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Spain entered the democracy game just as the rest of Western Europe was starting to 
develop the deregulation process.  
In radio, democracy brought with it a series of technical plans. That of 1978, 
the last to be made in Spain for AM frequencies, allowed no increase in the private 
sector, but easily doubled the number of public stations. Another example of the 
occupation and accumulation of frequencies in those years, following a more political 
logic than one of efficient management, was the successive allocations of FM 
frequencies, more or less every ten years, even though it was always said that there 
was no room for more. As for the private radio sector, the successive extensions of the 
FM spectrum in 1979 (300 frequencies), 1989 (352), 1997 (350) and the last one in 
2006 (866) were, in all cases, a mess of denunciations and accusations of favouritism 
(Arboledas, 2009; Arboledas and Bonet, 2014). It is beyond the scope of this article to 
provide a full review of archives and bibliography, but the fact is that, as more than 
one study has shown, the structural bases, despite the differences, are still the same as 
they were in the Franco era (e.g. Arboledas and Bonet, 2014), with the awarding of 
frequencies to large media groups that are supportive of the political party in power 
(i.e. PRISA, Godó, Mediaset, Atresmedia). Clientelism and the political 
instrumentalisation of the radio spectrum plays a major role in these tenders, as 
each government (whether national or regional) tends to grant licences to the 
companies that it considers to be supportive (Arboledas, 2009; Arboledas and 
Bonet, 2014; Fernández-Quijada and Arboledas, 2013). 
One of the most controversial and obvious examples of the occupation of the 
spectrum and a posteriori regulation was the so-called ‘Pilot Plan’. In late 2002, it was 
known that the autonomous Catalan government had made a pact with the association 
of private Catalan radio stations (Associació Catalana de Ràdio) in order for some of 
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them (i.e. SER, COPE, R. Estel, RAC 1, Onda Rambla, among others) to be able to 
occupy twenty frequencies (the number would later be increased), which enabled 
them to extend their coverage. At the same time, this was considered a way by which 
the Catalan government and radio private sector put pressure on the Spanish 
government to plan a new distribution of licences throughout Spain, to show that 
there was still a free radio spectrum available. Theoretically, the plan was to last for 
only six months, after which a tender would be called, and did not represent any 
definitive right for the beneficiaries. The Plan did not last six months but rather 
almost six years and was possible thanks to a political agreement between central and 
regional governments that was outside of the legal framework of the time. Finally, in 
2008, these frequencies were awarded, and in almost all cases to the same radio 
groups that were already making use of them (e.g. Spanish radio groups Cadena SER, 
Cadena COPE, Vocento or former Grupo Antena 3, now Atresmedia; or Catalan radio 
groups like Godó, Grup Flaix or Ràdio Estel). 
The management of television frequencies in the eighties and nineties 
followed a very similar pattern to that of radio. With the arrival of democracy, a dual 
transformation process occurred in the sector: decentralisation and liberalisation. In 
ther early 80s, local public and private televisions and regional public channels started 
broadcasting. At the end of the decade, national private television stations were born. 
As we argue in the following lines, decentralisation was a clear example of the 
primacy of political interests over technical or legal ones; that is, more political 
than rational.  
 The birth both of regional and local television was not an orderly process that 
was fostered or managed by central administration. At first, the pioneering regional 
televisions (ETB in the Basque Country and TV3 in Catalonia) arose out of pressure 
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from the respective regional governments, who wanted their own television channels 
despite the reticence of the central executive. Both Basque (1982) and Catalan (1983) 
television started broadcasting despite not having central government’s permission to 
use the frequencies and without there being any law in force to allow this. A similar 
conflict arose when the Basque (1986) and Catalan (1989) governments decided to 
create a second regional channel, ETB2 and Canal 33 (despite this not being 
permitted by the law). The first Basque and Catalan channels were regulated a 
posteriori but the second ones were just politically tolerated even though they were 
manifestly illegal (Fernández and Santana, 2000; Authors, 2012). 
 In turn, local television emerged by initiative of city councils and local 
entrepreneurs, who set up channels despite the law not providing for such things. 
None of these channels -897 in the early 2000s according to AIMC (2002)- were fully 
regulated until 2005, after a previous attempt to legalize them in 1995 had failed. In 
other words, for more than 20 years, local television channels were broadcasting 
(some promoted by the local administrations themselves) without State 
permission and without the latter going to any major effort to prevent them from 
existing or to control their proliferation any further than the first few years (Guimerà, 
2006). At this point, it should be recognized that, compared with decentralisation, 
liberalisation was controlled: in 1989 the three private national television channels 
allowed by the law were launched (Telecinco, Antena 3 and Canal Plus). However, in 
this case, central government was also accused of favouritism in granting licences to 
entrepreneurs that were ideologically or personally close to the party in power. 
(Fernández and Santana, 2000).  
 
Digital occupation of the spectrum 
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DAB in Spain does not work, and all stakeholders are in agreement with the fact that 
its implementation as a technological audio standard was a failure (Bonet et al., 2009) 
and it illustrates how, in spite of not using the frequencies, the licensees don’t lose 
their rights over the licenced spectrum. Broadcasters have managed to reduce the 
obligations included in the licence by not paying the fee for the use of radio spectrum 
or extending the periods to cover the whole territory. But the frequencies are still 
being occupied, to the extent that a tender was called in 2011 to award licences in the 
Balearic Islands, thus repeating the pattern of giving licences to companies that do not 
use them. At the time of writing, none of the winning companies are broadcasting, but 
they are already occupying the frequencies 
Meanwhile, the management of the implantation of DTT (Digital Terrestrial 
Television), which should have involved a complete overhaul of the television 
system, did not elude the logic of politics and occupation either. The process began in 
1998 with a model based on the nationwide pay-TV platform, like in the UK 
(Iosifidis, 2011), that would exploit three and a half MUX (multiplexer) of the five 
foreseen (with the capacity for four channels each). The other half MUX was to be 
exploited by two new private operators (one channel each) and the remainder would 
be shared by three private analogue televisions and the two analogue channels of 
national public broadcaster RTVE. Once again, the tender for concessions was 
accused of clientelism of the ruling party, PP (Partido Popular, People’s Party). The 
winner of the three and a half MUX was Onda Digital, controlled by Retevisión, 
formerly a public company privatized shortly before by the government, and at the 
time headed by a person who would become a minister months later. The new private 
operators were Vocento and Unedisa, center-right publishers very active against the 
previous socialist government (Fernández-Quijada and Arboledas, 2013). Moreover, 
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the model was clearly opposed to the market reality and in 2002 Onda Digital went 
bankrupt and left the MUX that it had occupied free. 
 It would not be until 2005 that a new government, this time of PSOE (Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español, Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party), would restructure the 
spectrum: it distributed the available multiplexers to the surviving private operators 
and the public RTVE. But in defiance of all logic, in 2006 the same government 
called a tender for the creation of a new private state television, which was also to 
broadcast analogically. The winner was, once again, an entrepreneur close to the 
ruling government (La Sexta, formerly owned by Mediapro, and now part of 
Atresmedia). In 2010, and after the analogue switch-off, the national DTT map was 
completed. The executive awarded, without any tender, a greater number of MUX to 
the operators in order for them to extend their offer. This decision, which went against 
the law, ended up in court and ended in 2014 with a sentence that ordered the 
Government to shut down the nine channels that had been granted illegal licences in 
2010. As a result, Atresmedia lost three channels and Mediaset, Vocento and Unidad 
Editorial lost two each. The total number of private nationwide channels went from 
28 to 19.  
 This process of legal closures overlapped in time with the liberation of the 
digital dividend before 1 January 2015. Successive central governments have awarded 
so much radio spectrum to their respective political clients that by late-2014 they were 
occupying a large part of the spectrum that, from 2015 on, should have been used by 
telecommunications companies for 4G mobile services. This led to a process of 
replacing antennas and retuning TV sets that was managed in such a short space of 
time and with such deficiency that by late-2014 it was clear that it would not be 
completed in time or form. In fact, the Spanish Government delayed the final DTT re-
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tuning, which finally took place on March 31, 2015. Broadcasters, carriers, retailers and 
viewers needed to adapt networks and antennas to receive the new frquencies, and the 
risk of people left without DTT was high in some parts of the country.   
 
Conclusions 
We initiated this work with the general hypothesis that in Spain a policy of 
‘occupation’ of the spectrum guided by political and clientelistic interests has always 
prevailed, which has impeded any professional attempt to define a rational and 
efficient broadcasting model, both under the Dictatorship and in times of Democracy.  
The indices and evidence collected during the fieldwork show that the logic 
applied during four key, historic moments in the development of the audiovisual 
model in Spain has marked the form of management, which has remained historically 
dominated by political criteria and scarcely governed by principles of efficiency, 
neither economic nor technical. In fact, the policy of occupation of the radio spectrum 
has been a previous step required in order for governments to develop their 
clientelistic policies in different processes of awarding radio and television 
frequencies. 
 
Although the transition to democracy involved greater transparency and 
control, the form to carry out territorial and political decentralization was a clear 
example of the primacy of political interests over technical or legal ones; that is, more 
political than rational. In fact, clientelism and the political instrumentalisation of radio 
spectrum played a major role in all the tenders, as each government (whether national 
or regional) tended to grant licences to the companies that it considered to be 
supportive. Digitalisation and its binary code were a first serious intent of rationality, 
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but it is now, when in all of Europe traditional broadcasters feel expelled from their 
historically occupied frequencies range, that total efficiency could arrive. 
 
In fact, we could say that the process tends to follow the same pattern:  
a) The spectrum is occupied,  
b) Frequencies are filled more for political than professional motives, 
c) Sometimes (digital radio for instance), frequencies are awarded but not used 
or under-utilized,  
d) On other occasions (digital radio again), broadcasters are allowed to reduce 
the obligations included in the licence to cover the whole territory. 
 
Both the under-utilization and coverage obligations are some of the likely situations 
experts gave warning about (GRETEL, 2007; RSPG, 2014). 
Definitively, the survival of the method for controlling and occupying the 
spectrum and the persistence of clientelism in the media means we can say that Spain 
followed the atavistic orientation defined by Jakubowicz and Süskösd (2008). It is 
also a demonstration of the adaptation capacity of clientelism, one of the fundamental 
pillars that define the Mediterranean model, according to Hallin and Mancini (2004).  
To this, the authors add another defining element:  the absence of a prevailing 
‘rational-legal authority’; in its place, a regulation has precedence on the basis of 
consummated facts or when the international context obliges Spain to comply with 
standards. In fact, it is sometimes the State bodies themselves (regional and local, but 
also central administration) that occupy the spectrum and fail to respect the applicable 
legal framework, catering for the interests of the local political elites.  
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 From January 1, 2015, it is also necessary to analyse where the liberalization 
of the spectrum is heading as the different Spanish governments have debated and are 
debating between compliance with European standards (which are considerably 
liberalising in themselves) and the inherent historical conception of managing the 
spectrum more as a political platform than a technological one.  
 The demands and disputes concerning the spectrum and its way of 
management are traumatic, but they could be, in the same way, the manner of 
guaranteeing this rational and efficient use that should not be at odds with the public 
good.  
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